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Background: This article proposes an approach to comparing and assessing the adaptive capacity of multilateral
health agencies in meeting country and individual healthcare needs. Most studies comparing multilateral health
agencies have failed to clearly propose a method for conducting agency comparisons.
Methods: This study conducted a qualitative case study methodological approach, such that secondary and
primary case study literature was used to conduct case study comparisons of multilateral health agencies.
Results: Through the proposed Sequential Comparative Analysis (SCA), the author found a more effective way to
justify the selection of cases, compare and assess organizational transformative capacity, and to learn from agency
success in policy sustainability processes.
Conclusions: To more affectively understand and explain why some multilateral health agencies are more capable
of adapting to country and individual healthcare needs, SCA provides a methodological approach that may help to
better understand why these agencies are so different and what we can learn from successful reform processes. As
funding challenges continue to hamper these agencies' adaptive capacity, learning from each other will become
increasingly important.Background
Reforming multilateral health agencies, such as the World
Health Organization (WHO), the Global Fund to Fight
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund), and
UNAIDS for greater effectiveness in meeting healthcare
needs is an important area of research. As nations face
challenges effectively responding to disease, demands on
these and other multilateral agencies have increased. These
agencies find themselves in a difficult position, as the on-
going global recession has led to a decline in government
and private sector contributions to these agencies at a time
when country needs have increased. This problem has mo-
tivated scholars to examine the willingness and capacity of
multilateral health agencies to overcome these challenges,
transform and sustain their policy missions [1,2].Correspondence: Eduardo.gomez@kcl.ac.uk
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unless otherwise stated.This study claims that better understanding and explain-
ing this process may benefit from a new comparative
methodological approach to examining if, why, and how
multilateral health agencies not only reform their organiza-
tions and policies but also how they sustain reforms over
time. Indeed, what seems to be missing in the literature is
a clearly defined, systematic methodological approach for
comparing, analyzing, and explaining both the reform of
multilateral health agencies and the sustainability of re-
forms. Here, I define sustainability as the ongoing funding
of policy innovations as well as the creation of venues for
new policy ideas and learning. However, to better under-
stand why some agencies achieve sustainability and why
others do not, one must first analyze and compare the will-
ingness and reform capacity of multilateral health agencies.
In an effort to achieve this, this study introduces a
comparative method for analyzing multilateral health agen-
cies. Drawing from the social science institutional theory
literature, I propose a Sequential Comparative Analysishis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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within multilateral health agencies. Through this approach,
investigators may use institutional theory, such as path de-
pendency and institutional change theory, to select agen-
cies for comparative analysis. These theoretical frameworks
are used to choose agencies that represent theoretical –
rather than empirical - issues and concerns. Researchers
then compare agencies confronting similar types of the-
oretical issues in order to discover and explain differences
in organizational and policy reform, concluding with a
comparison of those agencies that have sustained their
reform efforts.
In this study, the cases of the WHO, the World Bank,
and UNAIDS were selected because they a) were emblem-
atic of a particular institutional theoretical approach; and
b) because they either provided an example of the failure
of multilateral health agencies to achieve reform or were
a good example of institutional change and sustainabil-
ity processes. Such an approach is suitable when the
goal is to learn more about particular case studies while
providing new insights into a topic that has already been
investigated [3].Methods
This article conducts a qualitative methodological ap-
proach to comparative analysis. Empirically, this study
relied on various published sources, such as media and
peer-reviewed journal articles, books, and reports from
multilateral health agencies. In terms of methodology,
this article uses an analytical narratives perspective [4].
According to this approach, the goal is to select case study
examples as illustrations of the potential efficacy of a theor-
etical approach. The objective is therefore not to randomly
select case studies in order to test established theories with
the hopes of creating a generalizable claim.Sequential comparative analysis and institutional theory
To better understand and explain the complex processes
involved in reforming multilateral health agencies, a meth-
odological approach for selecting and comparing agencies
is needed. To fill in this lacuna, this study proposes a
methodological approach called a Sequential Comparative
Analysis (SCA) to comparing and analyzing multilateral
health agencies. This approach is sequential and compara-
tive because it compares and explains reforms within
multilateral health agencies, over time. And it is analytical
because it uses institutional theory to guide the selection
of those agencies to be compared. Therefore, agencies are
not chosen for their similar organizational structure and
policies – e.g., agencies falling under the UN system, or
philanthropic institutions, such as the Bill & Melinda
Gates foundation, but for their illustration of the utility
of a particular institutional theory.As the first step in this approach, and as Figure 1 illus-
trates, Stage 1 entails selecting and comparing multilateral
health agencies that provide examples of a particular insti-
tutional theory, such as path dependency. Path depend-
ency theory is selected because it is a school of thought
explaining why institutions often fail to reform for greater
effectiveness [5,6]. Path dependency takes a historical ap-
proach to explaining why individuals within institutions
often fail to engage in more efficient reform processes,
even when they are aware of their institutional and/or pol-
icy inefficiencies (ibid). Several concepts and causal mech-
anisms account for these inefficiencies.
For example, institutional legitimacy and learning cre-
ates incentives for individuals not to pursue institutional
reforms. Problems of institutional legitimacy arise when
policy-makers adhere to a particular set of institutions,
regardless of their known inefficiencies, mainly because
of the institution’s widespread support among trusted
peers; this support arises because of the institution’s re-
peated track record of success, as well as peers’ subject-
ive beliefs that it is the appropriate institution to select
[2,5,7]. While alternative and more effective institutions
may be present, they are avoided, even without engaging
in rational cost-benefit analysis (ibid). Alternatively, the
challenge of institutional learning occurs when individ-
uals receive a high level of knowledge and training into
a particular policy and/or institutional approach [8,9].
Because of their extensive knowledge and training, as
well as the passing down of this knowledge from peers,
policy-makers feel comfortable and confident in a par-
ticular policy/institution; as a result, they believe that it
stands above any alternative, more effective approach.
Other path dependency theories focus on resource con-
straints within institutions, such as increasing returns –
synonymous with sunk costs theory [8,10,11]. The challenge
of increasing returns emerges when individuals initially
invest an excessive amount of financial and technical re-
sources into an institution, ultimately making it too costly
to switch to another more efficient institution notwith-
standing the known inefficiencies associated with the
existing institution (ibid). When discussing the production
of typewriter keyboards, for example, David [11] claimed
that because firms invested too much money and tech-
nical training into the initial construction of the keyboard,
despite the keyboard eventually being perceived as too
ergonomically difficult – e.g., its QWERTY letter design,
because an excessive amount of resources and training
had already been invested in constructing the keyboard,
the organizational costs of switching to another more
ergonomically efficient keyboard greatly exceeded the ben-
efits [8,10,11].
These path dependency theories may then be used to
select multilateral health agencies exhibiting instances of
these theorized problems. For example, and as Figure 1
Stage 1- Comparing Path Dependent Processes Stage 2- Instances of Institutional Change    Stage 3 – Learning from Sustainability
1 2 3 1 2 3
Path Dependent Theoretical Learn from case of sustainability
Concept: Concept:
Legitimacy (L): L L L Conversion (C): C C C
Increasing
Returns (IR): IR IR IR Displacement (D): D D D
Cause: Cause:
Reform (R) R none none Sustainability Processes (SP)
SP none none
Outcome: R No R No R Outcome: S1 none none
1 “S” stands for Sustainability.
Figure 1 Sequential Comparative Analysis (SCA).
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the aforementioned legitimacy and increasing returns con-
straints. Questions derived from these theories, such as
why individuals within agencies repeatedly refrain from
adopting new policies, may guide the analyst’s selection of
cases. Researchers then search for agencies and empirical
case study literature suggesting this repeated problem.
The next step is to compare multilateral health agencies
in order to see which of these agencies eventually pursues
reform. The goal is to discover the causal mechanisms that
led to institutional change – denoted in Figure 1 as “Cause.”
Individuals within multilateral agencies may successfully
pursue reforms because of their strategies to work with ex-
ternal actors that help legitimize their call for reform [12].
Others may instead appeal to either the media, multilateral
agencies, or transnational health movements to delegitimize
the agency’s policies (ibid). An eventual outcome arises
where multilateral agencies vary in their ability to pursue
reform (“R”) or not – denoted as “R” or “No R” in Figure 1.
Next, the researcher transitions to Stage 2 in order to
better understand and explain how multilateral health
agencies pursued institutional change. In addition to select-
ing cases, institutional change theory is used to better
understand and explain the reform process. Without this
theoretical approach, it is harder for researchers to know
what they are looking at, i.e., the relevance of particular
agency officials, their interaction with other officials and
the international community [13].At its core, institutional change theory examines the
conditions under which individuals decide to break away
from path dependent processes and pursue reforms. In
contrast to path dependency, historical analysis is not as
important; rather, the confluence of interactions between
endogenous actors and exogenous conditions is (Mahoney
and Thelen [12,14]). For example, a process of institutional
conversion explains how individuals within institutions use
changes in the environment, such as international criti-
cisms and pressures, as well as supportive external allies to
re-shape and use existing institutions and policy proce-
dures for alternative, more effective policy ends (ibid; [13]).
Alternatively, an instance of institutional displacement
occurs when individuals within institutions work with
supporters outside of their institutions and use similar
changes in the environment to completely transform
their institution’s formal design and policy objectives [12].
And an instance of institutional de-legitimacy occurs
when individuals within institutions seek to discredit their
leaders by repeatedly highlighting their shortcomings and
failed policy objectives (ibid).
As I explain shortly, the case of the World Bank and
UNAIDS may provide good examples of institutional
conversion (C) and displacement (D) theory. Next, the
researcher compares these instances of agency transform-
ation in order to discover key causal differences in these
agencies’ ability to engage in policy sustainability – de-
noted in Figure 1 as Sustainability Processes. This study
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First, sustainability often requires that agencies ensure
that they continuously finance new policy initiatives. And
second, sustainability requires an agency’s ongoing re-
ceptivity to policy ideas and information; obtained from
publications, consultation from academics and even so-
cial media, this helps to obtain information, learn about
healthcare needs and adjust policies appropriately.
SCA’s final Stage 3 entails selecting cases of successful
sustainability and learning from them. Here, the investi-
gator selects a successful case(s) of agency sustainability
and strives to discover the causal mechanisms that can
help agencies sustain innovative responses to global health
challenges.
But why is the SCA method important? This methodo-
logical approach is important for several reasons. Chief
among them is the realization that, to the author’s know-
ledge, there are no systemically clear methodological ap-
proaches for comparing and analyzing multilateral health
agencies. While the works of Gómez [2], Gómez and Atun
[15], and Chorev [16] compare several multilateral health
agencies, they do not propose a systematic method for
comparative analysis.
Second, those studies that do exist choose and compare
multilateral health agencies based on their empirical prob-
lems. That is, health agencies are not selected and guided
by institutional theory; instead, they are selected in order
to provide insights into the empirical organizational, finan-
cial, human resource, and policy problems hampering
health agency performance. For example, the works of
Peabody [17], Glassman and Savedoff [18], and Chorev
[16] address these challenges within the WHO and Global
Fund and how they have constrained the governing board’s
ability to pursue reforms. Alternatively, case studies are
selected in order to explain an agency’s success in over-
coming these empirical challenges [19].
Additionally, efforts exist to compare and assess the
performance of multilateral agencies, such as the Multi-
lateral Organizational Performance Assessment Network
(MOPAN). MOPAN is comprised of a network of 17 donor
countries working together to analyze the effectiveness of
the multilateral agencies that they fund through the col-
lection of survey data, documents discussing agency per-
formance in achieving objectives, as well as information
obtained through staff interviews [20]. Known as the
“Common Approach” methodology, through these efforts
MOPAN provides a platform for agencies to exchange in-
formation and to learn from each other (ibid). Neverthe-
less, MOPAN’s analysis is not comparative, such that it
analyzes case studies on an individual basis [20].
Finally, studies seem to analyze multilateral health agen-
cies within a restricted period of time (Peabody [17-20]).
Scant attention is paid to analyzing reform processes over a
long period of time; nevertheless, as Pierson [21] maintains,this approach is needed in order to more accurately de-
scribe and explain institutional change processes and policy
outcomes. SCA achieves this process through its overtime
sequential analytical approach.
Analyzing SCA’s theoretical approach in light of
institutional theory
In the social sciences, a myriad of institutional theories
exist accounting for the performance of institutions.
Addressing this literature and comparing it with SCA’s
proposed path dependency and institutional change theor-
ies helps to justify why path dependency and institutional
change theory was chosen and why these two schools of
thought appear to be more advantageous in accounting for
similar institutional challenges and change processes within
multilateral health agencies.
Several theories have focused on the reasons why insti-
tutions often fail to pursue reforms for greater efficiency,
eventually leading to a path dependent process; some claim
that the challenge of institutional coordination effects
generates this undesirable outcome [8,22-24]. According
to Arthur [25], coordination effects emerge when institu-
tions, such as production industries, benefit from adopting
and maintaining a particular technology that other indus-
tries are using. Doing this, as well as adopting the rules
and regulations associated with the technology, helps to
lower the transaction costs of monitoring other industries’
actions, in effect, increasing the predictability of their strat-
egies; but this also facilitates policy planning, while leveling
competition and assuring profits. Arthur [25] claims that
these “positive network externalities” increase as more in-
stitutions join the network and adopt the same technology,
as well as the set of rules that go along with being a group
member. Because of these benefits, industries avoid pur-
suing any other form of potentially advantageous tech-
nologies because of the potential costs of leaving the
coordinating group and the start up costs involved in
joining another industrial network (ibid).
Policy feedback processes have also generated few incen-
tives to pursue policy and institutional change. According
to Skocpol [26] and Pierson [21], a feedback process oc-
curs when the creation of policies and/or institutions leads
to the rise of political and civil societal coalitions that, in
turn, sustain and safeguard these policies and/or institu-
tions [21,26]. Politicians benefit from safeguarding social
welfare benefits, for example, while civil society benefits
from continuously receiving social services (ibid). Eventu-
ally, these reinforcing political and civil societal coalitions
succeed in safeguarding their policy and institutional pref-
erences, even when others perceive them as inefficient,
costly, and in need of reform (ibid).
Finally, theorists have offered a cultural institutional
approach to explaining why actors fail to reform institu-
tions for greater effectiveness. Greif [27] maintains that
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ticular economic trade groups shapes the emergence of
trade institutions, i.e., shared expectations and coordin-
ation between merchants and traders, which safeguard
their institutional designs at the expense of crowding out
more effective alternatives. Grief [27] claims that cultural
religious groups will often prioritize their belief systems,
norms and expectations over the adoption of other policy
ideas and institutions that are proven to be more effective
and lucrative. Similarly, others have shown how conserva-
tive cultural beliefs within government institutions shapes
the rise of enduring condemnatory, inefficient laws and
welfare programs [28], while informal cultures of corrup-
tion have often hampered the reform of ineffective legal
institutions [29].
When compared to each other, however, it seems that
SCA’s proposed path dependency theories of legitimacy,
learning, and increasing returns are more effective than
coordination effects, policy-feedback, and cultural institu-
tional approaches to explaining the challenges of reforming
multilateral heath agencies. First, institutional coordination
effects may not be very helpful because multilateral health
agencies often do not adopt each other’s institutional de-
signs and policy ideas; instead, their policies are more often
influenced by the agency’s historical institutional formation
processes, policy preferences and experiences [15]. In light
of the importance of these historical factors (ibid), coordin-
ation effects may be further limiting because this approach
cannot tell us how preexisting multilateral health policies,
policy ideas, and experiences shape policy-makers’ views of
these policies, their ongoing success, popularity, and, there-
fore, legitimacy.
In contrast, theories of institutional legitimacy and
learning appear to be better positioned for taking into
consideration the importance of historical policy prece-
dents within multilateral health agencies and how these
precedents create incentives for decision-makers to refrain
from pursuing institutional change. Furthermore, when
compared to coordination effects, theories of legitimacy,
learning, and increasing returns are more applicable to ana-
lyzing multilateral health agencies mainly because these
frameworks discuss the interests, behaviors, and conse-
quences of policy-making elites rather than focusing on co-
ordinating relationships between multilateral agencies.
Policy-feedback processes also provide a limited approach
to analyzing multilateral health agencies. This is mainly be-
cause feedback processes focus on analyzing institutional
decision-makers as well as the civil societal actors that they
collude with, as the feedback process depends on the suc-
cess of their coalitional partnership. Nevertheless, policy-
making within multilateral health agencies has often been
driven by agency elites, such as governing board members
and presidents, not civil society [15]. Perhaps with the ex-
ception of institutions such as the Global Fund to FightHIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, policy-making and
policy sustainability processes never depend on the support
of civil societal actors (ibid).
Finally, a cultural institutional approach may provide
insight into the challenges that multilateral health agencies
face when considering reforms. Indeed, Peabody [17] has
argued that the WHO’s preexisting organizational cul-
ture of responding to diseases has continued to shape
the WHO’s epidemiological surveillance strategies, leading
WHO officials to avoid the pursuit of more effective
surveillance measures. Nevertheless, the challenge with
a cultural institutional approach is that it fails to provide
clear causal mechanisms into precisely how, as well as
which types of cultural beliefs (religious or non-religious,
e.g., organizational) shape policy-makers’ perceptions, in-
terests, and reform strategies. Are certain cultural beliefs
passed on to other multilateral agency officials? If so, how
and which ones? And which types of cultural beliefs affect
individuals’ views? Is it beliefs in preexisting policy experi-
ences, ideas, or routine (seemingly ritualized) managerial
practices?
In contrast, theories of legitimacy and learning not only
provide clear causal mechanisms illustrating how prior pol-
icy ideas and experiences influence agency officials’ policy-
making decisions, but these theories also clarify that it is
preexisting policy beliefs, experiences, popularity, and peer
support, rather than routine managerial practices, that mo-
tivates individuals to refrain from pursuing institutional
change.
In addition to explaining institutional stasis, recently
scholars have also explained the conditions under which
institutions eventually change for greater effectiveness.
Deeg [30,31], for example, has emphasized the import-
ance of international pressures in fostering institutional
change. For instance, domestic economic institutions, such
as banks, may at times confront international pressures to
comport with new kinds of financial transactions, account-
ing standards, and technologies, in turn motivating bankers
to reform their outdated banking procedures in order to
comply with international expectations and standards
(ibid). Others have argued that international pressures
also motivate ministries of health to reform their policies
and bureaucratic structure in order to bolster their inter-
national reputation for having effective public health pro-
grams [32,33].
However, institutional change does not have to be the
product of international pressures. Institutions may also
gradually evolve on their own [12,14,34]. Some argue
that domestic political interests and strategies within
institutions are more important. According to several
scholars [12,34-37], institutional layering theory, for ex-
ample, emphasizes this domestic approach, positing that
when reformers within institutions face considerable polit-
ical resistance to institutional change, they will instead add
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agency subdivisions, on top of existing institutions in order
to avoid ongoing political conflict, circumvent ineffective
institutions, and achieve their policy objectives.
Finally, others have argued that civil societal interests,
pressures, and mobilization strategies are important for
incentivizing governments to pursue institutional change
[7,38,39]. Civic movements succeed in using formal and/
or informal institutions to not only funnel their interests
but also to establish coalitions with those reform actors
seeking institutional change (ibid). According to Weir [38],
institutional change can only take place when policy-
makers are socially “embedded” and influenced by civil
society. Here, civic organizations and/or interest groups
take the lead in establishing reform coalitions with sup-
portive politicians and bureaucrats while using existing
institutional channels, such as legislative committee hear-
ings, to magnify their voice and influence (ibid; [40]).
But how does SCA’s recommended institutional change
theories of conversion and displacement compare to these
other institutional change theories when accounting for
reform within multilateral health agencies? And which
theoretical frameworks appear to be more helpful for un-
derstanding this process?
With respect to international pressures, while this ap-
proach may provide insight into the reasons why multilat-
eral health agencies pursue reform, it does not provide a
precise analytical explanation for how reform actors within
institutions use international pressures to assist them in
their cause. Do they ask other multilateral health agencies
to lobby the reform actor’s governing board on their be-
half, or perhaps NGOs and the media? In contrast, the
advantage of institutional conversion theory is its ability
to precisely explain not only which reform actors within
multilateral health agencies strive to take advantage of
international pressures (e.g., marginalized agency officials),
but more importantly, how they strategically use these
pressures in order to increase their legitimacy and influ-
ence when pursuing reform [12]; as I discuss later with the
case of the World Bank, this can be achieved by agency of-
ficials not only alluding to international pressures and criti-
cisms but also through their efforts to establish coalitional
partnerships with other supportive multilateral agencies.
Alternatively, institutional layering could provide insight
into how reform actors within multilateral health agencies
circumvent internal resistance to reforming their bureau-
cracy through the creation of additional committees build-
ing on top of preexisting committees. Nevertheless, the
application of this theory would leave us wondering how
and why these reformers were empowered to create add-
itional committees; what precisely were their sources of
strength and influence and where did these sources come
from? In contrast, institutional conversion and displace-
ment theory seems better positioned to answer thesequestions: this is because these theories can help to illus-
trate how reformers strategically use changing international
environments and supportive allies in other multilateral
health agencies to discredit inefficient institutions,
legitimize and empower their reform efforts. Conversion
and displacement therefore provide a fuller explanation for
the originating sources of reformers’ strength and influence.
Finally, with respect to civil societal approaches to in-
stitutional change, while this theoretical approach may
help to explain reform processes within democratic pol-
itical institutions, it is doubtful that civil society has had
just as much influence within multilateral health agen-
cies. For instance, while the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) has created several commit-
tees that allow civil societal actors to express their dis-
satisfaction with health and other social welfare policies
while potentially striving to build partnerships with World
Bank reformers [41,42], scholars find that the World Bank
and ADB’s governing boards and executive directors have
not been fully committed to incorporating the views of
their representative civil societal institutions [41,43]. Per-
haps the one exception would be the Global Fund, where
civil societal representatives – i.e., victims of disease and
the private sector – are present on the governing board.
Thus, because the influence of civil societal pressures on
multilateral health agencies is questionable, institutional
conversion and displacement’s focus on reform actors within
multilateral health agencies, as well as their strategic usage
of external conditions and allies in other multilateral agen-
cies, appears to be more applicable and advantageous for
understanding and explaining the transformation of these
institutions.
Empirical analysis and sequential comparative analysis (SCA)
Stage 1 – Comparing path dependent processes
As Gómez and Atun [15] explain, multilateral health
agencies falling under the UN’s governance structure
exhibit similar types of originating political coalitions,
interests, and designs in governing board accountability
and policy incentives. Yet, these UN agencies, such as
the WHO, UNAIDS, and the World Bank, can also be
compared to each other because of their similar path
dependent challenges, such as institutional legitimacy
and increasing returns. Historically, these path dependent
constraints have hampered efforts to reform these agencies
for greater effectiveness in providing technical and financial
assistance while meeting country needs (ibid; [2]).
The WHO provides a good illustration of how institu-
tional legitimacy and increasing returns poses obstacles
to achieving these outcomes. Peabody [17] states that
the WHO governing board and staff initially adopted the
YAWSa approach to epidemiological evaluation, technical
assistance, and organizational management as the most
effective response to disease outbreaks. During the 1970s,
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increasing returns theory, a high level of financial and tech-
nical investment went into YAWS (Peabody, [17]). These
initial investments underscored the high level of confi-
dence and belief in YAWS. Consequently, Peabody [17]
claims that an organizational culture arose whereby YAWS
was perceived by WHO staff as the most legitimate and
effective course of action to take in response to disease
outbreaks (ibid). Gómez [2] and Peabody [17] also claim
that over time, WHO staff learned and passed on this ap-
proach to other staff members.
Nevertheless, when new types of diseases emerged, the
legitimacy and increasing returns associated with YAWS
posed challenges to agency adaptability and response to
country needs. For instance, Peabody [17] claims that when
the HIV/AIDS epidemic emerged, WHO leaders, such as
Director General (DG) Hiroshi Nakajima, proposed an
alternative approach to studying HIV/AIDS, which in-
cluded examining preventative measures in the form of
condom use and education. WHO staff nevertheless
resisted Nakajima’s suggestions because they were not seen
as legitimate and effective [2,17]. Moreover, it seems that
the high level of initial investment into YAWS contributed
to this sense of resistance, as directors and staff found it too
difficult to shift to a new disease surveillance approach [2].
Years later, when DG Gro Bruntland emerged to
strengthen organizational efficiency [44], as well as part-
nerships with the private sector and WHO country office
capacity, Horton [45] and McCarthy [46] claim that WHO
staff resisted her reforms because they were perceived
as illegitimate and ineffective. While Bruntland succeed
in establishing these partnerships, she did not succeed
in strengthening organizational efficiency [47]. The same
dilemma occurred under DG Lee Jong-Wook’s efforts to
introduce reforms such as job rotation, transparency, and
the allocation of resources to WHO regional offices [2,48].
Since assuming office, similar legitimacy challenges have
challenged DG Margaret Chan’s efforts to strengthen
the WHO’s organizational capacity and responsiveness to
country needs [2]. WHO staff have resisted Chan’s ongoing
hierarchical approach to decision-making and policy imple-
mentation (ibid; [49]). Much of this resistance stems from
the staff ’s belief in their own approach to organizational
management and structure, which places an emphasis
on what they know best: participatory decision-making
and agency autonomy, hallmarks of the YAWS approach
(Peabody, [2,17]).
The World Bank also faced similar path dependent
legitimacy problems shortly after its creation in 1944.
Although the Bank was initially designed as an institution
providing loans for economic reconstruction in war-torn
Europe [50,51], by the 1950s pressures were increasing
for assistance to help nations combat poverty [50]. Board
members, as well as World Bank economists, startedclaiming that investing in health, education, and infrastruc-
ture facilitated timely economic development (ibid).
Nevertheless, the legitimacy of prior lending procedures
complicated the Governing Board and staff ’s ability to
transform the World Bank’s lending policies. Lending for
economic restructuring, as well the financial conditional-
ities imposed for receiving assistance, were policy traditions
passed down from one Governing Board and Executive
Director to the next [52]. Board members and Bank staff
believed that these policies were an effective and legitimate
course of action to take (ibid). Therefore, when the idea
of introducing anti-poverty programs emerged, first intro-
duced under Bank President Robert McNamara (1968-
1981) [53], board and staff members vehemently resisted
the notion, seeing these types of policies as illegitimate and
financially irresponsible (ibid). This difference between in-
creased international demands for Bank policies in poverty
alleviation, President McNamara’s support for these pol-
icies, versus Bank staff preferences to resist such policies
confirms other scholars’ view that the Bank has often be-
haved in a hypocritical manner [54].
UNAIDS also faced similar institutional legitimacy chal-
lenges. Created in 1996 in response to the UN’s inability to
effectively coordinate a response to AIDS [55], UNAIDS
was created in order to increase UN inter-agency coordin-
ation, encourage other UN agencies to contribute their
expertise and experience, increase and facilitate the sharing
of resources, technical expertise, and policy-making cap-
acity [19,56,57]. 10 UN agencies, also known as “cospon-
soring organizations,” fell under the leadership of the
UNAIDS Secretariat, which is primarily responsible for
providing technical and administrative assistance to UN
cosponsors and their AIDS programs [19]. UNAIDS is also
governed by a Programme Coordinating Board, comprised
of 22 Member States, the UN cosponsoring organizations,
NGOs, activists, and people living with HIV/AIDS (ibid).
Nay [19] nevertheless claims that the office of the
UNAIDS Secretariat was initially limited in its ability to
achieve its responsibilities, coordinate and find consensus
for policy reform. In addition to having an insufficient
amount of financial and technical resources to adequately
perform its duties, the Secretariat confronted a crisis of
institutional legitimacy within UNAIDS (UNAIDS, [58]).
This limited the Secretariat’s ability to pursue reforms; this
was mainly attributed to the fact that other co-sponsoring
UN agency directors believed that the most legitimate and
effective way to coordinate and reach a consensus over
reform was to engage in open discussions and consensus-
building between other UN agency cosponsors, not con-
tributing UN Member States, which was initially proposed
by the UN ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council)
(UNAIDS, [19,58]). These conflicting views contributed to
a high level of internal competition and contestation within
UNAIDS (ibid). When the Secretariat tried to increase
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ordination between participating UN agency cosponsors
and the Member States, UN agency cosponsors viewed
this endeavor as an illegitimate, ineffective move (ibid).
UN agency cosponsors displayed their views and discon-
tent by essentially ignoring the Secretariat’ efforts (ibid).
While the WHO, the World Bank and UNAIDS all ex-
perienced initial path dependency challenges, some of
these agencies eventually succeeded in pursuing reform.
As Gómez [2] explains, the World Bank and UNAIDS
eventually proved capable of reforming their bureaucratic
procedures and policies, in turn strengthening their re-
sponse to international and country needs. But how did
the World Bank and UNAIDS achieve this? Addressing
this question takes us to Stage 2 of SCA.
Stage 2 – Instances of institutional change
Stage 2 of SCA requires that the researcher use institu-
tional theory, such as institutional change theory, to select
cases and to explain how and why those multilateral health
agencies examined during Stage 1 eventually transformed.
At this stage, the researcher may choose from the afore-
mentioned menu of institutional change theories, such as
conversion, displacement, and de-legitimacy, to more accur-
ately explain why and how these agencies transformed.
Using institutional change theory and its causal mecha-
nisms helps to organize and make sense of the complex
interplay between exogenous and endogenous conditions,
agency interests, and reform strategies [2,13].
When it came to the World Bank, institutional conversion
helps to explain why the Bank eventually decided to break
away from its aforementioned path dependent tendencies
and decided to change its policy mandate from focusing on
lending for economic restructuring to funding health and
social welfare policies. According to institutional conversion
theory, previously marginalized individuals within an insti-
tution seek to re-use existing institutional rules and policy
procedures for new policy ends. When new exogenous
criticisms and pressures emerge, these marginalized in-
dividuals strategically use these external pressures to
discredit existing policies and their supporters [12,14].
At the same time, these individuals seek influential allies,
who are often located outside of their institution, in order
to strengthen their legitimacy and influence [14].
This is precisely what occurred at the World Bank during
the 1960s. As Ruger [53] explains, by the early-1960s the
Bank was exposed to intensive international criticisms
and pressures to transform its policy focus from strictly
providing loans for economic reconstruction to providing
loans for poverty, education, and health. Though ignored
for several years, members of the World Bank’s IDA
(International Development Association), an arm of the
World Bank providing financial assistance to low in-
come countries [52], emerged to strategically use theseinternational criticisms in order to underscore the Bank’s
inequitable policies, as well as the fact that they were not
helping nations emerge out of poverty [2]. IDA staff mem-
bers believed that financing health and education was the
best way to eradicate poverty [59].
Furthermore, Gómez [2] writes that in tandem with
these exogenous pressures, IDA staff sought to strengthen
its ties with supportive leadership staff at the WHO and
UNESCO [59]. By establishing a strong partnership with
these agencies, IDA staff was able to legitimize their
efforts, their proposed policy ideas and influence within
the Bank (ibid; [52]). By the early-1960s, these efforts paid
off: the IDA was able to succeed in convincing the Bank
Board of Executive Directors that it had to transform its
policy priorities from strictly funding economic recon-
struction to also funding health, education, and other pov-
erty alleviation programs [2,52].
UNAIDS also joined the World Bank in eventually
breaking away from the aforementioned path dependent
inefficiencies of institutional legitimacy. Theoretical pro-
cesses of institutional displacement help to explain how
this occurred. Displacement processes arise when previ-
ously marginalized individuals within institutions strategic-
ally use a change in the external environment, such as
international pressures or crisis situations, to delegitimize
existing institutional procedures and policies and replace
them within new ones, establishing new policy goals and
aspirations [12]. These sudden shifts in the environment
in turn empower those individuals seeking institutional
change (ibid).
Nay’s [19] discussion of UNAIDS’ transformation since
2005 provides a good example of displacement processes.
As mentioned earlier, during the 1990s the UNAIDS
Secretariat was marginalized, seen as illegitimate in the
eyes of co-sponsors. Yet, Nay [19] claims that after the rise
of international pressures for a reform of the UNAIDS
structure and procedures, the agency began to change.
Specifically, Nay [19] states that: “International institutions
tend to be path dependent, and only external inducements
may have encouraged them to opt for change.” These
international pressures emerged from international donors,
NGOs and governments claiming that UNAIDS was
incapable of adequately responding to country needs,
for failing to establish strong partnerships between co-
sponsors, insufficient human resource capacity, discrepan-
cies between priorities and objectives, mistrust between
managerial teams, as well as a general lack of funding and
transparency [19,2]. UN Secretary General Kofi Anan also
contributed to this censure, arguing for the need for admin-
istrative reform, while organizing international conferences
advocating increased harmonization and coordination be-
tween UN agencies [19].
Furthermore, Gómez [2] and Nay [19] claim that
these international pressures empowered the previously
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pealing to these external criticisms, the Secretariat was
able to justify its need to essentially completely revamp
the entire UNAIDS structure, as well as reforms that went
well beyond the Secretariat’s initial attempt to increase its
leadership and coordinating role [2]. By 2005, the Secre-
tariat succeeded in transforming the entire way UNAIDS
was governed [60]. New policies were also introduced
focusing on performance-based managerial and financial
instruments [19,60]; increasing inter-agency coordination
through the creation of new steering committees [19,60];
a clear division of labor and responsibilities for policy
implementation [19]; and new efforts to make funding
and policy decisions transparent.
Thus by the mid-2000s, the World Bank and UNAIDS
successfully broke away from their path dependent inef-
ficiencies and pursued institutional change. But the key
question to ask is if and how these agencies were capable
of sustaining their new initiatives and if they differed in
the manner in which they achieved this? Addressing this
question requires that we compare the World Bank to
UNAIDS in order to see which of these agencies engaged
in sustainability processes, which is denoted as (SP) in
Stage 2 of SCA, in Figure 1.
Sustainability processes
Let us first consider the World Bank. Since the late-
1990s, the Bank has sustained its efforts to play an im-
portant role in global health through increased funding
and program expansion, aided by a substantial rise in Bank
Members States’ capital commitments [61]. During this
period the Bank also became the largest multilateral finan-
cier for health with a portfolio of 154 active and 94 com-
pleted projects [62,63]. Governing board members soon
realized, however, that they had not properly anticipated
the increased demand of country funding for diseases, such
as HIV/AIDS (ibid), while also realizing that greater in-
vestments in healthcare were needed [64]. In an effort to
sustain the Bank’s HIV/AIDS policies, analysts note that
“the Bank responded flexibly to the demand for such lend-
ing, among other things, with (a) a strategy for intensifying
action against HIV/AIDS in Africa in July 1999, (b) the $1
billion Multi-country AIDS Program (MAP) in September
2000 …” (ibid: p. 74). Initiated in 2000, MAP provided a
15 year funding commitment, submitted in 3 phases, with
the first considered to be a series of emergency loans,
followed by lending for health systems, prevention, com-
munity participation and accountability, as well as HIV/
AIDS treatment (ibid; [65]). To sustain and strengthen
MAP, in 2002 the Bank approved another $500 million in
grant funding, which extended MAP financing in 29 coun-
tries throughout Africa [66]. Furthermore, in order to fur-
ther ensure MAP’s success, in 2000 the Bank funded the
MAP “Horizontal Adaptable Program Loan” (APL), whichincorporates the involvement of civil societal organizations
(CSOs), the private sector, ministries outside of the minis-
tries of health, and trans-boundary populations such as ref-
ugees [66]. By 2006, in response to continued country
needs, the Bank further sustained its commitment to HIV/
AIDS by creating the AIDS Strategy & Action Plan (ASAP).
ASAP is a jointly proposed initiative with UNAIDS that
helps nations achieve full country ownership for their
HIV/AIDS programs (ibid).
In 2007, as a further sign of the Bank’s sustained commit-
ment to combating HIV/AIDS, it unleashed its Agenda for
Action (AFA) [66]. With this endeavor the Bank stressed
that the “principle goal of the AFA is to reaffirm the Bank’s
promise to devote its resources to help halt and begin to re-
verse the spread of HIV/AIDS” (ibid: p. 6). Through AFA,
the Bank is committed to providing $250 million dollars
per year for HIV/AIDS initiatives; and to establish an HIV/
AIDS grant incentive fund of $5 million dollars annually to
promote capacity building (ibid). The overall goal of AFA is
to build on ASAP and its emphasis on helping countries
develop long-term, sustainable responses to HIV/AIDS;
to strengthen the implementation of policy; to enhance
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E); and to strengthen
health systems and coordination with donors (ibid).
And finally, realizing that the Bank was no longer the
main provider of funding for HIV/AIDS, considering the
arrival of funders such as the Global Fund, GAVI, and
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Bank refocused
its policy efforts to emphasize its historic comparative
advantage: i.e., health systems strengthening, health fi-
nancing, and governance (ibid). In fact some claim that
in order to sustain and deepen its presence in global AIDS
policy, the Bank took on new policy roles, such as trans-
forming from dominant financier to a development partner
and complementary funder, which analysts claim required
a “larger and more complex role” (ibid: p. 35).
Sustaining the World Bank’s work on global health
through the creation of new programs and funding has
also benefited from the Bank’s commitment to continuously
incorporate external policy ideas. Since the late-1960s,
beginning with the Bank’s shift to anti-poverty allevi-
ation strategies, the Governing Board and staff have in-
vited scholars and policy-makers to provide new ideas
on how to scale up the Bank’s work in this area [53].
Global health in particular has benefited from the penetra-
tion of new policy ideas, reflecting a continued increase in
country requests for learning and assistance [53,67]. Since
the late-1980s, the Bank has organized several conferences,
at times co-sponsored with the WHO, bringing together
health policy experts from academia to provide new
insights into strengthening health systems and health
governance [53,68]. Through the Bank’s Development
Research Group (DECRG) and the Social Development
Department (SDV), Bank staff have also periodically
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and capacity building in response to AIDS [69]. Moreover,
from 1997 to 2008, the Bank has funded the provision of
over 300 short courses on health systems strengthening
through the World Bank Institute’s Flagship Program on
Health Sector Reform and Sustainable Financing [67]. In
recent years, the Bank has also increased its collaboration
with the private sector to learn about new innovations in
health system strengthening and, more recently, health
information technology and management [70]. The Bank
has also provided a venue for publishing and disseminat-
ing the views of academic scholars and policy-makers on a
wide range of health issues [53]. Ruger [53] indeed claims
that over the years, the Bank has produced “210 country-
specific HNP sector studies and staff appraisal reports and
hundreds of country strategy documents on HNP topics.”
When compared to the World Bank, UNAIDS has also
been committed to sustaining its commitment to HIV/
AIDS by funding new program initiatives. Given the in-
ability of the Global Fund and bi-lateral contributions
(especially from the US) to maintain funding commitments,
which is mainly due to the ongoing global economic reces-
sion [71], UNAIDS has called for a sustainable increase in
funding arrangements to make sure that HIV and AIDS
victims continue to receive the prevention and treatment
services that they need [72]. UNAIDS has not only asked
its contributing UN Members States for more funding for
its programs [73], but it has also called on new financial
innovations and means to raise revenue: “We need new
financial modalities and sources of funding such as the
financial transaction tax to maintain the momentum of
the AIDS response,” argued Mr. Michael Sidibé, UNAIDS
Executive Director [72].
In response to this challenging economic context,
UNAIDS’ Programme Coordinating Board and Secretariat
has been committed to sustaining and increasing their
financial commitments to various program initiatives. In
response to country needs for greater technical assistance,
in 2005, for example, UNAIDS created the Technical
Support Facilities (TSF) [74], which are located in ap-
proximately 80 countries in Africa and Asia [74]. Through
the assistance of country officials and the proactive par-
ticipation of NGOs, TSFs provides technical assistance
for a variety of policies, as well as assistance in grant ap-
plications, in order to establish institutional capacity for
responding to AIDS [74]. In 2006, and as mentioned
earlier, UNAIDS worked with the World Bank to create
ASAP, while in 2009, several new prevention initiatives
were implemented, such as the Action Framework for
Universal Access for Men who have Sex with Men and
Transgender People [75] and the Action Framework
Addressing Woman, Girls, Gender Equality and HIV
[76]. And in order to further ensure that these Action
Frameworks are implemented, in 2010 the OperationalPlan (2010-14) was created. Managed by UNAIDS staff as
well as woman in civil society, while meeting twice a year,
the Operational Plan further deepens UNAIDS’ commit-
ment to responding to the needs of woman and children
by striving to implement three areas of the aforementioned
Action Framework Addressing Woman: 1) strengthening
strategic guidance and support to national governments to
“know their epidemic and response,” so as to more effect-
ively meet the needs of woman and girls; 2) help countries
in order to make sure that national HIV/AIDS programs,
plans, and M&E frameworks address the needs and rights
of woman and girls; and 3) advocacy, capacity strengthen-
ing and mobilization of resources for the needs of woman
and girls in the context of HIV [76].
And in response to UNAIDS’ realization that more
work needs to be done with respect to women’s human
rights and protection from HIV, in 2011 it was proposed
that a UNAIDS Women’s agency be created (ibid). Al-
though no further details have been released to date, this
is an innovative and much needed response, further
highlighting UNAIDS’ innovative ideas and sustainability
of its financial and policy commitments.
Finally, in response to UNAIDS’ Second Independent
Evaluation (SIE), which began in 2007 in order to con-
duct a thorough analysis of the agency’s success, limita-
tions, and suggestions for improvement, the Getting to
Zero initiative was launched in 2012 [77]. This initiative
follows through with the SIE’s recommendation, released
in December 2009, that UNIADS exhibit not only stronger
leadership but that its programs also become more fo-
cused, strategic, flexible, and responsive (ibid). Realizing
this need, Getting to Zero establishes new goals and pro-
cesses to achieve zero HIV infections by 2015; to get zero
AIDS related deaths by 2015; and to achieve zero discrim-
ination by that date as well (ibid). Following SIE’s 2009 rec-
ommendation, then, Getting to Zero has a specific focus
and goal, while outlining several joint initiatives that can
help achieve them.
Finally, UNAIDS has remained open and committed to
obtaining feedback from external evaluators, researchers,
and civil society on how to improve its policies. In addition
to inviting academics to co-author reports on a variety of is-
sues, such as the UNAIDS Reference Groups working papers
and a myriad of Annual Meeting Reports, UNAIDS has also
recently engaged in innovative on-line strategies to obtain
information and learn. In 2011, for example, the CrowdOu-
tAIds.org initiative was created in order to reach out to the
youth about their HIV/AIDS status [78]. Through this on-
line interactive service, youth from around the world can
communicate with UNAIDS staff about their experiences,
provide information and suggestions for how to improve
UNAIDS work with them (ibid). To the author’s knowledge,
this is the only multilateral health agency that has employed
these social media tools to obtain new information and
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striving to collaborate with external policy experts and aca-
demics, it is different from the Bank in that it is exploring
alternative ways to learn and adapt to country needs.
In sum, in recent years the World Bank and UNAIDS
have been able to successfully engage in sustainability pro-
cesses. Yet, there are some differences with respect to how
these agencies have achieved this outcome. While both
agencies have been committed to increasing their financial
commitments to new programs, they have differed in terms
of their approach to human resource reform and innova-
tions in acquiring external policy ideas.
Stage 3 – Learning from sustainability
But why do these findings matter? Answering this ques-
tion takes us to Stage 3 of SCA. At this point the goal is
to learn from successful instances of multilateral agency
sustainability and to provide lessons for other agencies
striving to sustain their reform efforts. For instance, the
cases of the World Bank and UNAIDS revealed that
successful agency sustainability requires that multilat-
eral agencies have the ongoing willingness, commitment
and capacity to continuously finance new policy initiatives
and respond to country needs. The World Bank and
UNAIDS periodically created new policies and changed
their policy roles in response to these needs as well as in-
dependent evaluations. Nevertheless, this is an endeavor
that other multilateral agencies, such as the WHO and
the Global Fund, have not been able to achieve ([1,2];
Gómez and Atun, [15]). WHO and Global Fund leaders
may therefore wish to learn from the World Bank and
UNAIDS’ sustainability strategies.
Second, the cases of the World Bank and UNAIDS sug-
gests that agencies striving for sustainability requires that
agency leaders consistently incorporate new policy ideas
from academia and/or from civil society. Merely conduct-
ing independent evaluations within agencies is inadequate.
Rather, agencies should continue to create venues and pro
new ones in order to obtain different types of external ideas
and policy strategies. The Global Fund, for example, could
learn from this approach. When compared to the World
Bank and UNAIDS, the Global Fund has not been open to
establishing venues for external researchers to provide new
ideas about policy and governance issues. Moreover, the
Global Fund does not have a formal research department,
where it can learn and disseminate information about inno-
vations in health governance and financing. Perhaps it is
time that the Global Fund learn from the World Bank and
UNAIDS in exploring how policy insights from external re-
searchers can lead to more effective policy interventions.
Discussion
As multilateral health agencies confront challenging glo-
bal economic contexts and difficulties in reforming theirbureaucracy and policies to meet country needs, scholars
and practitioners should strive to compare and analyze
why some agencies have overcome these challenges while
others have not. This study has argued that we can pro-
vide insight into these questions by using social science
institutional theories, such as path dependency and in-
stitutional change theory, to conduct a Sequential Com-
parative Analysis (SCA) of multilateral health agencies.
Path dependency theory can be used to guide the selection
of cases that have repeatedly proven incapable of pursuing
reforms, as we saw with the WHO, as well as the early
years of the World Bank and UNAIDS, while institutional
change theory could subsequently be used to select, com-
pare, and explain cases that eventually pursued reform, as
we saw with the World Bank and UNAIDS.
SCA may also help to justify why particular agencies
are selected and compared. It is often the case that prac-
titioners and scholars simply choose multilateral health
agencies for comparison because they exhibit similar polit-
ical origins, such as agencies emerging from the UN system
(Gómez and Atun, [15]); because they share similar types
of policy interests and missions; or because they share
similar types of governance arrangements, e.g., WHO and
UNAIDS versus the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and
the George Soros foundation. Also, researchers have typic-
ally chosen and compared agencies because of their simi-
lar empirical challenges: e.g., leadership and governance
challenges; funding problems; inadequate policy designs
and outcomes [15-18]. In contrast, SCA suggests that
cases should be selected based on their similar theoretical
issues and challenges: e.g., instances of the path dependent
mechanisms of agency stasis (learning and legitimacy), as
well as the mechanisms of institutional change (conversion
and displacement). Through this comparative approach,
we may also discover challenges that affect all types of
multilateral health agencies, regardless of their originating
structures, policy roles, and missions.
The application of path dependency and institutional
change theory also leads to a sequential analytical approach
to understanding the transformative capacity of multilat-
eral health agencies. That is, an application of both theoret-
ical schools of thought forces researchers to move from an
analysis of why agencies do not pursue reform to how and
why they eventually do. This, in turn, requires an overtime
sequential analysis that better captures and explains the
transformative nature of multilateral health agencies. SCA
therefore forces scholars to move away from more typical
multilateral agency comparisons in finance, human re-
sources, and policy reform at particular moments in time
([16-19]; Nay). This study therefore agrees with Pierson’s
[21] notion that only after we have examined independent
variables and causal mechanisms over a long period of time
can we truly capture and explain the transformative poten-
tial of institutions.
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methodological approach. For example, this study’s pro-
posed definition of agency sustainability may be missing
several elements that contribute to this process. Perhaps
political support and pressures from influential govern-
ments; peer pressure from other agencies sustaining their
reforms; and bold and creative agency leadership may also
explain why agencies engage in sustainability processes.
Future researchers will need to expand the number of
multilateral agencies assessed and compared to provide
more insight into this matter. Relatedly, more case studies
will need to be investigated in order to see if the SCA ap-
proach is helpful. This article only examined 3 multilateral
health agencies; this was done because the goal was to
explore and illustrate the potential effectiveness of SCA
rather than to confirm SCA’s generalizable application
and utility.
But it is also important to note that there are several
limitations to the path dependency and institutional change
theories used to conduct the SCA comparative method.
While earlier in this article I underscored these theories’
advantages when compared to other similar institutional
theories, this is not to say that my proposed path depend-
ency and institutional change theoretical frameworks can
and should explain all types of path dependent and institu-
tional change processes within multilateral health agencies.
For instance, with respect to institutional learning
and legitimacy, these theories may not be very effective
when striving to explain institutional stasis and inefficiency
within more recently established multilateral health agen-
cies, such as the Global Fund, GAVI, and UNITAID;
instead, these theories may be more applicable and ef-
fective when explaining these challenges in older, well
established multilateral health agencies, such as the World
Bank, WHO, and UNAIDS. Indeed, because the Global
Fund was created in 2003, the impact of its preexisting
policy ideas and experiences may not be as influential in
shaping policy-makers’ decisions when compared to the
older World Bank and WHO, multilateral agencies that
have been providing donor aid assistance in health for
almost half a century. In contrast to the World Bank
and the WHO, the Global Fund and GAVI have not
been established long enough to create policy legacies
and learning processes that generate path dependent
legitimacy constraints. Future research will need to ex-
plore other path dependent and/or other related insti-
tutional stasis theories providing insight into the limits
to institutional change within recently establish multi-
lateral health agencies.
Nevertheless, limitations also emerge with the author’s
usage of institutional change theory. While conversion
theory, for example, may help to explain policy and orga-
nizational transformations within some multilateral health
agencies, e.g., the World Bank and UNAIDS, it may notbe helpful for explaining other instances of institutional
change. This mainly has to do with conversion theory’s
dependence on changing external conditions, e.g., inter-
national criticisms and pressures, and coalition forma-
tion processes between policy-makers within institutions
and other external institutional allies as necessary condi-
tions for change to occur. And yet, institutional change
may also occur in the absence of these causal conditions.
This suggests that conversion and displacement theories can
only explain institutional change when multilateral health
agencies confront challenging external environments, such
as heightened international pressures and criticisms, and
when reformers can find allies in other multilateral agencies
that are willing to support their cause.
In the absence of these external conditions, the reform
of multilateral health agencies could be aided by alterna-
tive institutional change theories. For instance, a sudden
change in agency leadership, such as the emergence of a
new agency president with bold ideas, interests, and sup-
portive governing board members, may provide the presi-
dent with the autonomy and political resources needed to
pursue institutional and policy change. In this context,
one could use theories of institutional power [6] in order
to show how the combination of an agency leader’s cap-
acity (measured in terms of increased autonomy and re-
sources, i.e., political or financial), as well as the leader’s
clear policy vision and commitment, leads to successful
institutional change.
For example, future research may wish to explore how
the arrival of World Bank President Jim Yong Kim has
added greater institutional power to his presidential of-
fice (in part, aided by years of US government influence
through its appointment of World Bank presidents
[50,51,79]) through a combination of heightened gov-
erning board support, external political support, and
President Kim’s well-establish track record and passion
for working on global health issues. With time, given his
background and interests we may also see a shift in World
Bank priority lending for healthcare projects, a potential
move that has concerned other World Bank agency divi-
sions [80].
The limitations of the author’s proposed path depend-
ency and institutional change theories therefore suggest
that several different types of institutional theories could
be used for conducting the SCA comparative method.
The path dependency and institutional change theories
used in this article were provided as an example of the
potential utility of using institutional theories to guide
the selection and comparison of multilateral health agen-
cies. Future research may nevertheless wish to explore the
vast array of other institutional theories to see if they can
provide stronger insights into understanding the static,
evolutionary, and sustainable nature of multilateral health
agencies.
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This study has proposed a comparative method for bet-
ter understanding the transformative and sustainable
capacity of multilateral health agencies: i.e., Sequential
Comparative Analysis (SCA). To the author’s knowledge,
SCA is the first attempt to provide a clearly defined, sys-
tematic methodological approach to comparing multilat-
eral health agencies. SCA encourages scholars and agency
staff to strategically use social science institutional theory,
such as path dependency and institutional change theory,
in order to select, compare, and better explain the abil-
ity of multilateral health agencies to pursue reforms and
to sustain them over time. Going forward, this meth-
odological approach suggests that scholars should re-
frain from selecting and comparing multilateral health
agencies based on their ongoing empirical challenges.
Instead, researchers should let social science institu-
tional theory guide their selection of case studies, com-
parative analysis, and policy lessons.
Endnote
aYAWS comes from a disease discovered by the WHO
in the 1960s. According to Peabody [17], the WHO’s re-
sponse to YAWS led to practices that the agency adopted
for other diseases, such as: 1) holding international sym-
posia; 2) offering fellowships to staff; and 3) prescribing
penicillin and more recently, technical meetings, consulta-
tive visits and the provision of supplies.
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